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Abstract
The contingency theory of conﬂict management and current crisis management 
literature are integrated in this paper to examine how crisis has been communi-
cated and managed by the Singapore government and what kinds of strategies 
arose during the various stages of the SARS crisis life-cycle. Findings show 
that the Singapore government played a predominant role in managing how 
its multiple publics perceived the crisis by extensive communication through 
the news media. The media, in turn, playing a supporting nation-building 
role, assisted the government's management and communication of the crisis. 
To effectively manage the perception and emotion of the various public, the 
government had recourse to more accommodative stances. Accommodation 
embedded in advocacy was the operational approach adopted by the govern-
ment in order to move its multiple publics in the same strategic direction along 
an  continuum of accommodation.
Keywords: Crisis Communication; Singapore; Media; Contingency Theory; SARS; 
Publics
Introduction
For several months in 2003, the world was besieged by a strain of virus 
that masqueraded as pneumonia but inﬂicted a far more lethal effect. 
By all accounts, the mystery of how the SARS (Severe Respiratory Acute 
Syndrome) virus originated has remained largely unsolved (New York 
Times, 24 May 2003: 1). What began as routine fever and cough in a 
Chinese physician, later identiﬁed as a super-carrier, rapidly spread to 
those who came into cursory contact with him, spiralling into a world-
wide crisis and infecting people across Asia and as far as Canada (New 
York Times, 27 April 2003: 1).
SARS arrived in Singapore, a cosmopolitan city-state nestled at the tip 
of Malaysia, when three women fell ill after a visit to Hong Kong in Febru-
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ary 2003. Infected by people who had been infected by the super-carrier, 
the women, in turn, infected others until it became an epidemic of crisis 
proportions. By early March, a SARS 'ministerial combat unit', comprising 
ﬁve junior government ministers (The Straits Times [hereafter ST]. 4 May 
2003: 1}, had been set up by the government to direct and co-ordinate 
efforts to ﬁght SARS. On 18 March 2003, Singapore entered the World 
Health Organization's (WHO) list of SARS-hit countries. With the esca-
lation of the crisis, a 'ministerial task force', comprising a high-powered 
committee of ﬁve senior government ministers and four junior ministers, 
representing a cross-spectrum of agencies ranging from health to educa-
tion, transport and information, was promptly formed (ST, 7 April 2003: 
1). The following months marked the frenetic pace at which the Singapore 
government worked to contain and communicate the SARS crisis to the 
different segments of the public, eventually leading the WHO to declare 
Singapore SARS-free on May 31. The WHO's verdict on the government's 
handling of the crisis was 'Exemplary' (ST, 1 June 2003: 1). 
Most studies on the SARS crisis have focused on the local level, on the 
relationship between the organization and its public (Dougherty 1992; 
Seegar and Ulmer 2002; Wigley 2003). These studies analysed the strate-
gies used by organizations communicate with their respective publics, 
such as employees, stakeholders, the media, and the community, when 
the organization appeared to be culpable (Fink 1986; Fearn-Banks 2002; 
Henry 2000; Pauchant and Mitroff 1992). Some studies have focused 
on communication strategies (Booth 1993; Barton 1994; Ray 1999; Lu-
kaszweski 1997; Henry 2000; Cohn 2002; Davis and Gilman 2002) and 
communication planning (Marra 1998; Ferguson 1999). Other studies 
have centred on relationship/issues management and media relations 
(Pauchant and Mitroff 1992; Barton 1993, Harrison 1999; Massey 2001; 
Ulmer 2001; Cowden and Sellnow 2002; Seegar and Ulmer 2002), particu-
larly at times of organizational culpability and crisis responsibility. 
However, few studies have sought to examine how the crisis was 
communicated by the government at a strategic national level, espe-
cially when culpability could not immediately be determined. Yet, as 
Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1997) have argued, it is critical to understand 
the roles governments play in times of crises, particularly when the 
threat, as in a crisis like SARS, exists in the socio-political system. At 
such times there is a necessity for prompt decision-making by the gov-
ernment, and a need to engage the public fully in whatever remedial 
approach it seeks to promote. The criticality of communication roles, 
we argue, is heightened in times of crisis.
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This study seeks to examine how crisis is communicated and managed 
at the macro level, between the government and its diverse publics, and 
to understand the kinds of strategic communication stances and strate-
gies used in a crisis situation. Besides contributing a new theoretical 
perspective to the crisis literature by integrating the contingency theory 
of conﬂict management with current crisis literature, this study sheds 
light on the strategic communication approach used by a government 
during crisis governance. The critical role the media played in this crisis 
communication campaign will also be explored. It is hoped that this 
study will generate practical insights for governmental strategic commu-
nication practitioners on the most appropriate strategic communication 
approaches and techniques to be adopted in similar scenarios.
Literature Review and Research Questions
Development of Crisis Theories in Public Relations Research
Much of the literature on effective public relations at times of crisis has 
been built on Grunig and Grunig's (1992) and Grunig and Hunt's (1984) 
public relations' excellence theory, which Fearn-Banks (2002:15) argued, 
forms the 'bedrock of most crisis communications theories'. The main-
stay of the excellence theory, the two-way symmetrical model which 
postulates that during a crisis, both the organization and its publics 
should engage in active dialogue so as to resolve the crisis in a profes-
sional, ethical and effective way, has been positioned as normative 
theory (Fearn-Banks 2002).
However, instead of clustering and pigeon-holing public relations 
practices and techniques into rigid and inﬂexible models, an alterna-
tive perspective has argued that strategic communication could more 
accurately be portrayed through a continuum model. The continuum, 
argued Cancel and colleagues (1999: 172), explains 'an organization's 
possible wide range of stances taken toward an individual public, dif-
fering from the more proscriptive and mutually exclusive categoriza-
tion'. In the contingency theory of conﬂict management, Cameron and 
his colleagues took the idea of continuum further by examining how 
organizations practise a variety of stances, how those stances change, 
sometimes almost instantaneously, and what inﬂuences the stance 
change (Cancel et al. 1997). 
The organizational response to the crisis at hand, according to the 
contingency theory, can situate at any point along the continuum, which 
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has, at one end, advocacy, and at the other end, accommodation. The 
theory offers a matrix of about 90 factors, arranged thematically, upon 
which the organization can draw to determine their stance. Between 
advocacy and accommodation is a wide range of operational stances 
that inﬂuence strategies and these 'entail different degrees of advocacy 
and accommodation' (Cancel et al. 1997: 37). Any of these factors can 
affect the location of an organization on that continuum 'at a given 
time regarding a given public' (Cancel et al. 1999: 172; Yarbrough et al. 
1998: 40). The contingency theory sought to understand the dynamics, 
within and without the organization, that affect a given stance. By un-
derstanding these dynamics, it elaborates and speciﬁes the conditions, 
factors and stances along a continuum, aiming to 'offer a structure for 
better understanding of the dynamics of accommodation as well as the 
efﬁcacy and ethical implications of accommodation in public relations 
practice' (Yarbrough et al. 1998: 41). 
This study aims to identify the strategies and contingent factors that 
affect the organization's operational stance towards its multiple publics. 
The organization, in this case, is the Singapore government, which in-
cludes any government-related agency, such as the Ministry of Health, 
National Environment Agency, or Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority, 
involved in ﬁghting SARS. 
By the same token, while the contingency theory recognizes that 
there can be numerous publics to be addressed at a given time, any 
attempt to deal with the public relations stance that encompasses all 
the publics is 'difﬁcult at best' (Cancel et al. 1997: 37). Ray (1999) and 
Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt (1996) supported this observation. What is 
known, however, is that the publics are dynamic and can take different 
forms, and hence the stances taken towards them must be equally, if 
not more, dynamic. 
New insights of studies of the contingency theory found that the 
publics are not 'monolithic', and the issues and the publics can be inter-
woven to form a cohesive whole that is dynamic and often 'long-lived' 
in public memory (Yarbrough et al. 1998: 54). Thus, another purpose of 
this study is to identify, deductively, who the publics are in this crisis, and 
to understand what contingent factors appear to move the stances of the 
organization, and what contingent factors appear to move the publics 
on the continuum of accommodation. 
Our questions are, therefore:
Q 1.1: How did the stances of the Singapore government toward the 
publics differ over time, as evident in the news coverage?
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Q 1.2: How did the stances of the different publics toward the Singapore 
government differ over time, as evident in the news coverage?
Q 1.3: What contingent factors appeared to affect the stances of the 
Singapore government, as evident in the news coverage?
Q 1.4: What contingent factors appeared to move the Singapore govern-
ment as well as the publics on the continuum of accommodation, 
as evident in the news coverage?
Crisis Communication Strategies along the Continuum 
Scholars also found that some contingent variables feature more promi-
nently than others. Studies on the contingency theory have shown that 
certain key variables predisposed an organization to accommodation 
while others prohibited any form of accommodation. Then, there are 
other intermediate variables that have the power to steer the organiza-
tion towards either more accommodation or advocacy, depending on 
the prevailing circumstances.
Cameron and his colleagues (2001) argued that there are times when 
accommodation is not possible at all, owing to moral, legal and regu-
latory reasons. He labelled them proscriptive variables. Six have been 
identiﬁed: 
1. When there is moral conviction that an accommodative or dialogic 
stance towards a public may be inherently unethical; 
2. When there is a need to maintain moral neutrality in the face of 
contending publics; 
3. When legal constraints curtail accommodation; 
4. When there are regulatory restraints; 
5. When senior management prohibits an accommodative stance; 
and 
6. When the issue becomes a jurisdictional concern within the organiza-
tion and resolution of the issue takes on a constrained and complex 
process of negotiation. 
Of the six variables, four – moral conviction, contending publics, 
legal constraints and jurisdictional issues –  preclude accommodation 
'on some occasions' (Cameron et al. 2001: 255). 
To study the full range of advocacy or accommodation undertaken by 
the organization towards its publics and vice versa, we have integrated 
Coombs's (1998) crisis communication strategies into the contingency 
framework. Coombs's typology consists of seven strategies: attack, 
denial, excuse, corrective action, justiﬁcation, ingratiation and full 
apology. To reﬂect the true spirit of the contingency theory, we have 
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modiﬁed this framework by re-ordering corrective action and justiﬁca-
tion, and by adding another strategy, co-operation, to the continuum 
(see diagram below).
Advocacy      Accommodation
I----------I-----------I------------I----------------I-----------------I------------I----------I--------------I
Attack    Denial    Excuse    Justiﬁcation    Corrective     Ingratiation      Co-operation       Full
 Action       Apology
Given the range of strategies that can be used, we wanted to ﬁnd out:
Q 2.1: What strategies utilized by the Singapore government were evi-
dent in the news coverage?
Q 2.2: What contingent factors appeared to affect the strategies of the Sin-
gapore government in the crisis, as evident in the news coverage?
Publics in a Crisis
Publics are 'speciﬁc audiences' targeted by the organization. Davis and 
Gilman (2002) argued that a key role the organization should embark 
on in a crisis is to identify the publics and develop appropriate mes-
sages to reach out to them. Ray (1999) posited that because the publics 
have different perceptions of what caused the crisis, the organization's 
communication with them could ameliorate any unfounded anxieties. 
Plowman et al. (1995) suggested that the role of strategic communi-
cation in a crisis centres on the management of conﬂict between the 
organization and its important stakeholders. Coombs (1999) argued 
that an organization thrives or survives by focusing and managing the 
stakeholders. 
In a crisis, the publics have been deﬁned differently, according to 
their importance to resolving situation, their functional roles and their 
long-term inﬂuences. Lukaszweski (1997) argued that there are four 
key publics that the organization must communicate with, and that 
communication must begin as soon as possible. They are: 
• those most directly affected, the victims; 
• the organization's employees, who may bear the brunt of the publics' 
wrath; 
• those indirectly affected like families and relatives; 
• the news media and other channels of external communication. 
Harrison (1999) argued that local community and pressure groups, and 
the government could form the next signiﬁcant layer of the publics. 
Dougherty (1992) preferred to examine the publics in terms of their 
functional roles and proposed four categories. Enabling publics, which 
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include shareholders, board of directors and regulatory agencies, have 
the power and authority to control the organization's resources. Func-
tional publics mainly consist of the organization's consumers. Normative 
publics are formed because of shared values, like political or interest 
groups. Diffused publics are people who are not members of a formal 
organization, yet, nonetheless, are powerful groups; they include the 
media and interested citizens. Ulmer (2001) categorized the publics in 
terms of their long-term inﬂuences. He perceived the primary public as 
the community in which the organization works, and the employees. 
The customer and the media he classiﬁed as a secondary public. 
Publics' Perception and Emotion of the Publics in a Crisis
Fink (1986: 20-25) developed a four-stage model of a crisis life-cycle: 
1. Prodromal crisis stage, or the warning stage; 
2. Acute crisis stage, or when the crisis happens; 
3. Chronic crisis stage, or the clean-up stage; and 
4. Crisis resolution stage, or when dust has settled and evaluations are 
made to assess how the crisis has been handled and what can be 
done to deal with the next one.
Pauchant and Mitroff (1992: 135-40) argued for a ﬁve-stage model 
that includes:
1. Detection of the crisis, or looking out for warning signs; 
2. Prevention/preparation of the crisis, or what can be done to prepare 
for its occurrence;
3. Containment, or  efforts to limit the duration of the crisis and localize it; 
4. Recovery, or restoring order and normalcy to the organization; 
and 
5. Learning, or the process of evaluating the crisis and examining what 
lessons can be learnt from it. 
In his three-stage model, Coombs posited a 'uniﬁed system' that could 
'accommodate all the various models plus additional insights' (1999: 
14). The three-stage model comprises the precrisis, crisis and postcrisis 
stages. The pre-crisis stage entails actions that organizations perform be-
fore a crisis hits. It involves three sub-stages: signal detection, prevention 
and crisis preparation. Among the measures suggested here are issues 
management, risk aversion and relationship building. The crisis stage 
involves the actions the organization can perform from the onset of the 
crisis to the time it is resolved. Coombs further divided this into three 
sub-stages: crisis recognition, crisis containment and business resump-
tion. Critical to this phase is communication with the publics. Coombs 
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argued that the last stage, the post-crisis stage, is equally important even 
though the crisis is ofﬁcially over. Organizations must consider how to 
be better prepared for the next crisis and make sure that stakeholders 
are left with a positive impression of the organization's crisis manage-
ment efforts. 
In this study we do not intend to precisely plot the life-cycle of the 
crisis through the coding of news stories. We propose instead to utilize 
Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt's (1996) paradigmatic development of a 
crisis model as a more appropriate reﬂection of the life-cycle of the 
SARS crisis; we will do this by generally looking at the crisis from birth, 
growth, maturity to decline. As the strategies the Singapore government 
employed varied over time, we propose that its publics' cognitive and 
affective responses to the organization's performance should also reﬂect 
the life-cycle of the crisis. 
Perceptions of the severity of the crisis can actualize in two ways: (1) 
perceptions of culpability and (2) perceptions of the locus of control of 
the crisis. Coombs (1998) argued that if the organization is perceived by 
its publics as culpable, it is more likely to utilize more accommodative 
strategies to control the damage. Consequently, if the publics perceive 
that the locus of control of the crisis lies with the organization, the per-
ception of its crisis responsibility increases. Conversely, if the publics 
perceive the locus of control to be external to the organization, the 
perception of crisis responsibility decreases. 
In this study, besides ﬁnding out where the Singapore government 
and its publics perceived the locus of crisis control to be, we also in-
vestigate how the perception of one party inﬂuenced that of the other. 
Thus, we seek to examine:
Q 3.1: What was the perception of the Singapore government and its 
multiple publics in the crisis situation, regarding crisis attribution 
and crisis damage severity, as evident in the news coverage?
Q 3.2: How did the perception of the Singapore government's perform-
ance, as evidenced in the news coverage, vary among the multiple 
publics involved?
Q 3.3: What contingent factors appeared to affect the publics' percep-
tion of the Singapore government's performance in the crisis, as 
evidenced in the news coverage?
Jin and Cameron (2003) called for greater attention to the construct of 
emotion in public relations theory by providing an adapted appraisal 
model of emotion in public relations and a crucial dimension to the 
conceptualization of the contingency theory. They further proposed 
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that any given stance can be assessed as a relational encounter with 
emotional forces that conform to a model expressed in three dimensions: 
(1) emotional tone as the valence of the emotion ranging from negative 
to positive; (2) emotional temperature as the intensity level of the emo-
tion; and (3) emotional weight regarding the importance of the emotional 
stimulus in strategic consequences (Jin and Cameron 2003: 16-17). Since 
the perceived severity works as emotional weight here, we are particu-
larly interested in examining the emotional tone and temperature as 
two key dimensions of the publics' emotion towards the organization 
in the crisis situation. Therefore, we seek to examine:
Q 4.1: What was the nature and strength of the multiple publics' emotion 
toward the Singapore government in the crisis situation, as evident 
in the news coverage?
Q 4.2: What strategies appeared to affect the publics' emotion toward 
the Singapore government in the crisis, as evident in the news 
coverage?
Method
This study employs the content analysis method to understand how 
the Singapore government managed the SARS crisis by strategically 
communicating with its multiple audiences through the media. Due to 
the rapidity, abruptness and volatility of the situation, and the exigency 
and imperative to communicate the crisis as efﬁciently and effectively 
as possible, the authors argue that analysis of the government's stance 
and strategies, as well as the publics' responses, through a study of news 
coverage, will provide an accurate representation of what happened. 
With every quick turn of events during the crisis, the government 
needed to communicate with its publics speedily. Arguably, the only 
way that it could do this was through a public platform that was acces-
sible to most, if not all, of its publics, i.e., through the media. Martinelli 
and Briggs (1998) argue that in a crisis, the media become an important 
tool to examine an organization's stances and strategies, and the effec-
tiveness with which it gets its messages across to its publics, rather than 
other means, like government-issued press releases. 
To capture the stance and strategies of the Singapore government 
through the media, only newspaper reports were analysed. Newspaper 
articles, often referred to as public records of history in the making (War-
rington 1997), are argued to provide a more detailed, comprehensive and 
chronological account of the management of the crisis than messages 
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disseminated through television coverage, which are arguably more epi-
sodic and ﬂeeting. In Singapore, the dominant newspaper is The Straits 
Times (established 1845). It is the highest circulating and most popular 
newspaper, with a readership of 1.351 million, representing 42 percent 
of newspaper readers (ST, 6 October 2004: H6). It is a prestige newspa-
per of international standing (Turnbull 1995). Kuo and Ang maintain 
that The Straits Times is 'pro-government and pro-Establishment' (2000: 
415), and that arguably, aiding the government in a national crisis like 
SARS, can be considered as part of its nation-building responsibilities. 
The elites and general readers monitor the newspaper as it often reﬂects 
government sentiments and the social reality that the government con-
structs for Singapore (Turnbull 1995). Thus, by focusing our analysis 
on the news reports in a prestige newspaper like The Straits Times, we 
endorse the view of Krippendorf (2004) and Riffe et al. (1998), that this 
approach will project a fair representation of the government's efforts, 
intentions, stances and strategies. 
Indeed, previous studies analysing an organization's strategic com-
munication stances through newspaper coverage have proved equally 
insightful (see Reber et al. 2003 Shin et al. 2003a, 2003b) Though we 
recognize the inherent methodological limitations of this approach, we 
would argue that these do not invalidate our purpose of determining 
which factors could have caused the Singapore government to move 
along the continuum towards its publics. 
Sample
The population of stories from 18 March 2003, when Singapore was 
declared by WHO as SARS-hit, to 7 June 2003, when Singapore was 
declared SARS-free, were sampled. Stories were uploaded from Lexus-
Nexus by typing in the key words, 'SARS' and 'Singapore'. This yielded 
2,018 stories. From the stories, the authors screened all of them based 
on the following criteria: (i) no editorials, opinions, commentaries or 
letters to the editors; (ii) at least two parties should be involved in the 
SARS story, with one of the parties being the Singapore government; 
and (iii) if there was more than one public involved in the same story, 
the dominant public would be identiﬁed as the prominent public for 
the story under analysis. To further delineate the selection of stories, up 
to four news stories that ﬁtted the criteria stated above were identiﬁed 
from each issue. If there were fewer than four news stories published 
in an issue, all the available stories were chosen for sampling.
The 2,018 stories were ﬁltered down to 258 stories which captured how 
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the Singapore government related to its publics. Five types of publics 
were identiﬁed: WHO (N=11), service professionals (including medical 
professionals such as doctors and nurses, taxi-drivers, and other service 
professionals, N=52), neighbouring countries (N=34), quarantined pub-
lic (patients and/or suspects) (N=68) and the general public (N=93). 
Coders and Training
Two coders, both graduate students familiar with the content analysis 
method, conducted the analysis. With the help of a codebook, the coders 
worked independently. Scott's Pi for intercoder reliability was .84 (p < 
.05). Chi-square, T-test, and ANOVA were used to analyse the data.
Coding Instrument
The unit of analysis is deﬁned as any news story. This includes stories by 
the staff of the newspaper and wire stories. The content analysis instru-
ment is designed to evaluate the stances and strategies of an organization 
in crisis management, its multiple publics' stances and perceptual as 
well as emotional responses to the organization's performance, and the 
contingent factors associated with the stances and strategies of the above 
parties. The operational deﬁnitions of stance and contingent factors are 
framed by the contingency theory and the crisis management literature. 
The 258 news stories were coded for 19 variables. These include: case 
source; news story number; publics involved in the crisis; the overall 
impression on the stance of the organization toward the according 
public; the overall impression on the stance of a speciﬁc public toward 
the organization; crisis strategy employed by the organization; the orga-
nization and the multiple publics' perception of the crisis situation; the 
public's perception of the organization's performance; and the public's 
emotion toward the organization in the crisis.
Adapting and merging Coombs's (1998) crisis communication strate-
gies into Cameron's continuum model of advocacy and accommodation, 
we propose to measure the government's strategies in terms of:
1. Attack:  Actively advocating that the public follow a certain course 
of action;
2. Denial: Stating that the culpability does not rest with the party in 
question, or denying that the crisis is of any consequence;
3. Excuse: Minimizing its responsibility for the crisis, and/or shifting 
responsibility of the crisis to an external factor;
4. Justiﬁcation: Explaining why it has to take a certain course of ac-
tion;
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5. Corrective action: Actively taking a course of action that is meant to 
address the problems in sight;
6. Ingratiation: Actively taking a course of action aimed to placate its 
publics.
7. Co-operation: Making overtures to reach out to the other party with 
the goal of resolving the problem;
8. Full apology: Taking full responsibility for the crisis and asking for 
forgiveness.
As for the contingency factors, we realized that we would not be 
able to analyse which internal factors in the matrix would cause the 
movement along the continuum purely through content analysis of 
news coverage. We have therefore decided to focus our analysis on the 
external variables, which we can possibly detect from content analysis. 
The key factors and their operationalizations are:
1. Threats: Stories that address the SARS virus, how dangerous it is; 
the SARS crisis and how it needs to be contained;
2. Industry environment: Stories that describe the impact SARS had on 
the economy and market;
3. General political/social environment/cultural environment: Stories that 
deal with political support for the people, political support for busi-
nesses; stories that show the organization wanting to lend the extra 
help to the people; stories that portray the organization trying to 
improve the livelihood of the people;
4. External public: Stories that address the unique characteristics of 
the public. For instance, if the public is the medical professionals, 
stories about the difﬁculties medical professionals face vis-à-vis the 
organization in trying to contain SARS;
5. Issue under question: Stories that address the image and reputation 
of the organization and its people;
6. Others: Stories that do not address any of the above.
Each story is coded as one entry and as a single primary issue.
Results
The data show that the government's stance toward different publics 
changed over time, according to external contingent factors associated with 
the changes. The dominant crisis management strategy employed by the 
government across the crisis life-cycle also varied according to different 
publics. The different publics demonstrated different stances across time. 
Contingent factors were found to be associated with those differences.
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Q 1.1 examined how the stances of the organization and its multiple 
publics moved along a continuum during the crisis. It was found that, 
for each pair of the government and a speciﬁc public, the two parties 
involved moved along a continuum from advocacy to accommodation 
in the crisis management process. The government accommodated to 
some publics consistently while advocating with other publics. For ex-
ample, on the one hand, the government (M=6.64) and WHO (M=5.45), 
government (M=5.04) and service professionals (M=5.75), and govern-
ment (M=4.03) and neighbouring countries (M=4.02) generally accom-
modated in the crisis process, with no stance difference showing in 
paired t-tests. For instance, it emerged during the crisis that the service 
professionals who were caring for the victims were also infected with 
the virus. Of the 31 victims who had died by the end of May, ﬁve were 
service professionals. The government, in recognition of their heroic ef-
forts, was relentless in providing ﬁnancial and moral support for these 
professionals, beginning with free medical care and culminating in the 
establishment of a Courage Fund, targeted to raise US$14.7 million (S$25 
million) to honour them. The chairman of the Board of Trustees wrote, 
'This is your strongest message to our healthcare workers that they are 
not alone in the ﬁght against SARS' (ST, 27 May 2003: 1). 
On the other hand, the stances between government (M=2.99) and 
quarantined public (M=6.38), and government (M=3.35) and general 
public (M=6.62) were marked by advocacy over time. Results also found 
that the government advocated strongly against the quarantined public 
(t=-8.045, p< 0.01) and the general public (t=-8.290, p< 0.01). Consistently, 
they used the full weight of the law to deal with people who broke their 
quarantines or who indiscriminately jeopardized the health of others 
by spitting. Invoking the Infectious Diseases Act, quarantine breakers 
were jailed (ST, 10 May 2003: 1) while those caught spitting were ﬁned 
(ST, 21 May 2003: 1).
In addition, signiﬁcant mean differences were found by comparing the 
stances of the ﬁve publics (F=4.13, p< .01). It was revealed that service 
professionals and the general public were most accommodative as re-
ported in the news coverage, while neighbouring countries were mostly 
advocatory across time, as described in the news coverage. 
Q 1.2 and Q 1.3 examined the contingent factors that affected each 
paired parties' stances in the crisis on the continuum. Threat seemed to 
be the predominant contingent factor in several instances:
1. In the government's stance towards the service professionals (44.2%, 
χ2=85.550, p< .001) and vice-versa (36.5%, χ2=74.647, p< .001); 
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2. In the government's stance towards neighbouring countries (44.1%, 
χ2=68.330, p< .01) and vice-versa (44.1%, χ2=45.740, p< .01); 
3. In the government's stance towards quarantined public (77.9 %, 
χ2=25.984, p< .05) and vice-versa (47.1%, χ2=81.163, p< .001); 
4. In the government's stance towards the general public (64.5 %, 
χ2=55.554, p< .001) and vice-versa (32.3 %, χ2=170.633, p< .001). 
What became evident was that from the beginning, the government 
had identiﬁed and isolated the SARS virus as the common enemy that 
everyone should battle against. Consequently, it was able to galvanize 
its publics to join its battle to overcome the enemy. 
Q 2.1 examined the communication strategies the government em-
ployed towards its multiple publics. It found that:
• With the WHO it used co-operation (54.5%) and corrective action 
(18.2%); 
• With service professionals it used co-operation (30.8%), ingratiation 
(26.9%) and attack (21.2%); 
• With neighbouring countries it used co-operation (33.3%), attack 
(41.0%) and justiﬁcation (11.8%); 
• With the quarantined public it used attack (47.1 %) and co-operation 
(19.1%); 
• With the general public it used attack (31.2%) and co-operation 
(24.7%). 
For instance, throughout the crisis campaign, while the government 
continually exhorted the general public to practise hygiene to prevent the 
spread of SARS, and was generally successful in doing so, it also sprin-
kled words of encouragement to afﬁrm their efforts. The government's 
use of diametrically opposing stance and strategies concomitantly may, 
perhaps, be exempliﬁed by the words of the Singapore prime minister: 
'I complain about their [the general public's] complaining all the time. 
But that's part of our character. When it comes down to the basics, I have 
tremendous conﬁdence in Singaporeans' (ST, 10 May 2003: 1).
Q 2.2 examined the contingent factors that inﬂuenced the strategies 
of the organization in the crisis. Threats appeared to predominantly 
inﬂuence attack (85.4%), denial (33.3%), justiﬁcation (70.0%), corrective 
action (76.0%), co-operation (47.2%) and full apology (50.0%); while the 
external public and issue under question seem to equally inﬂuence denial 
(33.3%); industry environment predominately inﬂuenced excuse (100%); 
and general culture inﬂuenced ingratiation (37.5%) predominantly. The 
association among the strategies and contingent factors was signiﬁcant 
(χ2=50.365, p< .01).
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In addition, the organization's choice of strategies was found to be 
associated with its stance (χ2=537.499, p< .001): Attack, denial and 
justiﬁcation seemed to be predominantly associated with a highly 
advocatory stance (86.6%, 100% and 40%, respectively). Corrective ac-
tion seemed to be predominantly associated with an advocatory stance 
(48%). Excuse seemed to be predominately associated with a lesser 
advocatory stance (100%). Ingratiation and co-operation seemed to be 
predominately associated with a very accommodative stance (87.5%, 
43.1%, respectively). Full apology seemed to be predominantly associ-
ated with accommodative and highly accommodative stances (50% and 
50%, respectively). This suggests that crisis communication strategies 
were inﬂuenced by the organization's strategy moving along the ac-
commodation continuum. 
Q 3.1 examined the perception of the government and its multiple 
publics in the crisis situation, regarding crisis attribution and crisis dam-
age severity. Both the government and its publics perceived the SARS 
crisis as generally externally controllable at the early stage of the crisis, 
and both perceived it as generally internally controllable at the later 
stage of the crisis. In terms of crisis damage severity, the government 
perceived it to be more severe (M=6.79) than did the publics (M=6.52). 
The paired samples t-test showed that the difference was signiﬁcant 
(t=2.526, p< 0.05).
Q 3.2 examined the multiple publics' perception of the organization's 
performance and Q 3.3 examined the contingent factors that affected 
the publics' perception of the organization's performance in the crisis. 
The publics' aggregate perception of the government performance in 
dealing with the SARS crisis seemed to be satisfactory (M=4.85). The 
predominant contingent factor affecting their perception was the factor 
of threats (37.2%). Signiﬁcant mean difference was found by compar-
ing the perception of the government's performance among the ﬁve 
publics (F=5.83, p< 0.001). Interestingly, the quarantined public and 
the general public felt most satisﬁed with the government's perform-
ance while the WHO and neighboring countries were reported as 
the least satisﬁed. Also, the publics' perception of the organization's 
performance was signiﬁcantly associated with the contingent factors 
(χ2=190.601, p< .001) and the strategies the organization employed 
(χ2=125.120, p< .001). 
Q 4.1 examined the multiple publics' emotion toward the organization 
in the crisis situation, and Q 4.2 examined the contingent factors that 
inﬂuenced the publics' emotion towards the organization in the crisis. 
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The publics' aggregate emotion towards the government performance 
in the SARS crisis seemed to be positive (M=4.79) and slightly intensive 
(M=4.19). The predominant contingent factor affecting both the emo-
tional tone and emotional temperature was the factor of threats (22.5%). 
Signiﬁcant mean difference in emotional temperature (intensity) (F=5.65, 
p< .001) was found by comparing the ﬁve publics via ANOVA, while 
there was no signiﬁcant difference in the ﬁve publics' emotional tone 
(valence). The general public were reported as the most emotionally 
intensive public while service professionals were the least emotional 
public. Also, the publics' emotional tone and emotional temperature 
toward the organization were signiﬁcantly associated with the contin-
gent factors (χ2=268.812, p< .001; χ2=318.245, p< .001), and the emotional 
tone was signiﬁcantly associated with the strategies the organization 
employed (χ2=82.386, p< .05). For instance, one public that the govern-
ment consistently supported and lauded was the service professionals 
(i.e., healthcare workers) who were caring for the SARS victims. When 
it emerged that some Singaporeans were ostracizing these service pro-
fessionals, for fear of being infected by them, it riled the general public 
into adopting the same stance as the government against such behaviour 
(ST, 6 April 2003: 4).
Discussion
Media in Strategic Communication during Crisis Governance
One reason, suggested by a WHO advisor, why Singapore won its ﬁght 
against the rampant spread of SARS so quickly was the government's 
ability to win the publics' trust (ST, 1 October 2004: 26). This was 
exempliﬁed in its ability to effectively communicate with its publics 
during the crisis (ST, 22 September 2004: H7). Indeed, most, if not 
all, government crisis communication was disseminated through the 
media, and it was evident that, in this regard, The Straits Times had 
performed its role as supporting the government in crisis governance 
with aplomb. This development journalism approach, where there is 
a co-operative relationship between the media and the government, 
is a situation, in most parts, accepted and preferred by the Singapore 
public. The media act as a 'mediator between the government and the 
public' and the public 'feels that it is well informed [about] what the 
government is doing' (Tan et al. 1998: 209). Despite this 'pro-govern-
ment stance', the public has a high regard for the media in most issues, 
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with the exception of coverage of domestic politics and opposition 
parties (Hao 1996: 121).
The Singapore government, for its part, did not make any apology 
for what it regarded as the responsibilities of the media. In a recent 
speech, in response to its low ranking in media freedom (140th out of 
167) by the Paris-based agency 'Reporters Without Borders', senior 
minister Goh Chok Tong reiterated that the media should, amongst 
other things, advance 'society's collective interest', and work for the 
'public good' (ST, 1 November 2005: 3). Indeed, the level of co-operation 
between the government and the media, particularly The Straits Times, 
in the reportage of a national crisis like SARS was so intertwined that 
the government had no qualms about rapping the newspaper publicly 
for publishing the name of the ﬁrst SARS victim, despite being told not 
to do so (ST, 7 May 2003).
Proactive Advocacy:  
A Hallmark of the Singapore Government Management Style
Our ﬁndings indicate that throughout the life-cycle of the crisis, the 
government and its publics' stances were constantly moving along 
a continuum from advocacy to accommodation. To a large extent, 
most of the publics followed the same stance of accommodation as the 
Singapore government. However, the government seemed to adopt a 
more advocatory stance in dealing with two publics – the quarantined 
public and general public – while these two publics appeared more ac-
commodating to the organization across time. For instance, when the 
SARS virus began to spread more rampantly in March, the government 
invoked the Infectious Diseases Act to home quarantine more than 800 
people for 10 days to curb the spread of the disease (ST, 25 March 2003: 
1). Those quarantined were mainly those who had been in contact with 
people who had fallen ill. When that measure failed to the situation, 
the government took the 'unprecedented' step of ordering all schools 
to be shut down, affecting more than 600,000 students, to prevent 
schools from becoming breeding grounds. 'The whole idea of closing 
the schools is to minimize large groups of students having close contact' 
the health minister stated (ST, 27 March 2003: 1). The school closures 
were further extended in April. The education minister described the 
exercise as 'putting in precautions to safeguard our children' (ST, 6 
April 2003: 1).
This measure illustrates the decision-making ability of the government 
to put in place what one newspaper columnist termed as 'bold and fast 
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moving' (ST, 17 April 2004: H15) social policies that required adherence. 
At the same time, the government also managed to win the support of 
the publics. This is consistent with Sikorski's (1996) assertion that the 
Singapore government is proactive in taking the lead and advocating 
judgement calls when it is confronted with threats to the country’s sur-
vival, particularly political threats, which, in this case, could be extended 
to biological threats as well. This 'pre-emptive-cum-proactive leadership' 
(ST, 24 August 2004:13) was evident even after Singapore was declared 
SARS-free. A day after the WHO's declaration, the government stated 
it was going back to the drawing board, this time to ﬁne-tune measures 
for any future similar occurrence (ST, 1 June 2003: 1).
The rationale for advocacy for the quarantined public and general 
public appeared to be thus: The quarantined public had to be told what to 
do so that it did not infect the general public, and the general public had 
to be told what to do so that the virus would not spread any further. 
Political Realism: Dealing with Important Publics 
Analysis of news coverage has shown that with publics such as WHO 
and neighbouring countries like Malaysia, the Singapore government 
appeared to adopt a more accommodative stance. The political realism 
in international relations, argued Zhang et al. (2003), is that even though 
advocacy may be used at ﬁrst, to maintain harmonious relations, this 
would eventually give way to accommodation. Two reasons are prof-
fered on why Singapore accommodated and showed deference towards 
WHO and neighbouring countries. First, Singapore was co-operating 
closely with the WHO, a world body, to ensure that all measures were 
in place to prevent the spread of the disease. For instance, when SARS 
became more widespread globally by the end of March, the WHO called 
for more stringent airport screening (ST, 28 March 2003: 1). Within three 
days, airport checks at Singapore's Changi airport had been tightened 
(ST, 31 March 2003: 1). When the hallmark of a relationship is that of 
co-operation, accommodation almost always takes precedence over 
advocacy. 
Second, an accommodative stance towards its neighbours, particularly 
Malaysia, is consistent with Singapore's long-standing relations, based 
on political realism, national and diplomatic interests (Nathan 2002). 
Instead of engaging in politics of one-upmanship, for instance, or en-
gaging in quarrels about who infected the virus to whom, the policy of 
the Singapore government appeared to focus the attention on how the 
threat (i.e., a common enemy, the SARS virus) could be nulliﬁed. On 5 
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April 2003, The Straits Times published a statement from the Singapore 
prime minister's ofﬁce saying that Singapore and Malaysia had agreed 
to co-operate closely in the war against SARS by sharing information, 
research ﬁndings and experience (ST, 5 April 2003: 7). This is consistent 
with Cameron and his colleagues' argument that the prevailing situ-
ational variables that facilitate accommodation are the urgency of the 
situation and the obvious threats in the environment (Yarbrough et al. 
1998; Cancel et al. 1999; Cameron et al. 2001). 
More Accommodation than Advocacy
The ﬁndings further suggest that crisis management is contingent in 
nature, associated with the contingent factors. In this study, the authors 
found more instances of accommodation than advocacy, with advocacy 
towards selected publics, based on power relationships and the stakes 
involved. A wide range of crisis communication strategies were utilized 
by the government in dealing with its multiple publics, which differed ac-
cording to their power relationship with the organization, occupation and 
risk levels in the crisis situation. Obviously, the organization used a dif-
ferent set of strategies which might be assumed to best target each public 
according to their different characteristics. For example, the predominant 
strategies the government employed in communicating with the WHO 
were co-operation and corrective action, which is a reasonable communi-
cative response towards a prestigious health organization, in view of its 
power and inﬂuence. On the other hand, the predominant strategies the 
government employed in communication with the quarantined public 
were attack, followed by co-operation, which might be explained by the 
fact that the government had to take demanding measures in controlling 
the virus but still tried to resolve the problem by collaborating with this 
key public. Again, threats seemed to be the predominant factor affecting 
the strategy. This is consistent with previous studies analysing the nature 
of conﬂict in the organization–public relationship, where threat was found 
to be a predominant factor (Shin et al. 2003a, 2003b).
Accommodation in the Midst of Advocacy
Shin et al. (2003b) suggest that the type of stances an organization adopts 
towards its publics is also dependent on the type of organization in-
volved. They found that non-proﬁt organizations were more likely to 
be more accommodative towards its publics, and vice-versa, than for-
proﬁt organizations. This was because non-proﬁt organizations were 
usually 'seen as the "good guys" of society – high-minded, compassionate 
100 __________________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 23•2006
Yan Jin, Augustine Pang and Glen T. Cameron _________________________________
organizations whose members worked to help people achieved a better 
life' (Wilcox et al. 2002: 410). 
In the SARS case, since the organization was a governmental or-
ganization, particularly one that is inclined to proactive advocacy, the 
Singapore government was seen to adopt an advocatory stance when 
it deemed the threat to be the overriding factor. At the same time, it 
adopted accommodative stances to 'sugar', if you will, the seemingly 
harsh medication it was advocating. For instance, while the Singapore 
government advocated and imposed strict regulations on the quarantine 
of infected patients and care-givers, especially after it became known that 
more medical practitioners such as nurses were becoming infected by 
their patients (ST, 9 April 2003: 1), it also promptly instituted measures 
to provide ﬁnancial relief. The health minister announced heavily sub-
sidized hospital rates and drugs for SARS victims; and full absorption 
of medical bills for practitioners, in what the health minister described 
as 'bearing the brunt' of the outbreak (ST, 11 April 2003: 1).
How the Publics Perceived the Crisis
A comparison of the multiple publics' perception of the crisis with that 
of the organization produced interesting ﬁndings. As Gonzalez-Herrero 
and Pratt (1996) suggest, the publics' perception of the crisis transpires in 
a dynamic way, depending on the crisis situation. Our results revealed 
that the government, on the whole, often perceived the SARS crisis to 
be more severe than did the publics. The day the WHO declared Singa-
pore to be SARS-free, the Singapore government maintained a cautious 
stance. Its statement noted: 'So long as there are SARS-infected areas 
in the region and the world, we cannot afford to let our guard down' 
(ST, 31 May 2003: 1). This could be, as Chong (2001) argued, the hall-
mark of the Singapore government's handling of issues of survival. By 
over-emphasizing the severity of a crisis, it erred perhaps on the side 
of over-managing rather than under-managing.
That probably explains why the government consistently regarded the 
crisis to be internally rather than externally controllable. The government's 
approach could be summed up in the prime minister's statement when 
he formed a high-level task force to tackle SARS: 'So that if something 
happens, we are ready, we don't panic … To the best of our ability, we 
are ready to try and cope with the new problem' (ST, 7 April 2003: 1). 
Resolution of crisis, it seems, like survival, is never to be left to chance. 
A key aspect of this strategy, then, was to manage the publics' percep-
tion of the organization's performance as well as their emotion towards 
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the organization. As an example of successfully dealing with the SARS 
crisis while maintaining its reputation and image, the Singapore gov-
ernment seemed to gain understanding and support from its publics 
in general across time. Our ﬁndings show that the publics were largely 
satisﬁed with what the government did, and evinced a positive feeling 
towards it. Chong (2001:37) argued that the Singapore government had 
indeed built a reputation for 'reliability, integrity, and efﬁcacy … in the 
management for survival'.
Implications
Overall, this study suggests both practical and theoretical implications 
for crisis management scholars and practitioners. Practitioners, particu-
larly those at governmental levels, can understand the opportunities and 
challenges of crisis management practice by identifying the contingent 
factors associated with the stances of its different publics, and by using 
appropriate strategies to maintain the organization–public communica-
tion and by fostering a good working relationship to resolve the crisis. A 
key strength of the contingency theory is that it allows us to understand 
the dynamic nature of the crisis and to make judgements on what stances 
and strategies are appropriate at every juncture. 
At the heart of the matter is the fact that it is not so simple to know 
exactly what works and what does not. It is the authors' hope that this 
initial effort to analyse how a particular government manages a crisis, 
not just at the local level, but also with worldwide implications, can 
provide some exploratory information for other researchers to pursue. 
Admittedly, one limitation of this study is that it analyses the stance and 
strategies based on media reports. The inherent limitation in a content 
analysis of news coverage is superseded by the exigency of the crisis and 
the imperative for the government to communicate the crisis through a 
media outlet that it trusted. Rather than positioning our paper as fully 
reﬂective of what the government did, we moderate our claims by 
emphasizing that this is one reading of what happened. This does not 
invalidate our ﬁndings of the factors that inﬂuence government stance, 
and how the publics responded in return. 
Further research, through examination of messages disseminated on 
television broadcasts, government press releases, as well as interviews 
with ofﬁcials involved in communicating SARS, may substantiate and 
triangulate our ﬁndings, or they may provide other insights outside the 
scope of this study. 
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Another limitation is that this study is focused on one country, 
which, in turn, limits the generalizability of how the strategies can be 
extrapolated to other countries. Future research could explore how other 
countries deal with the similar types of crisis, and assess the contingent 
factors that inﬂuence the stance or strategies of an organization and 
its publics. The subsequent ﬁndings would provide better conceptual 
understanding of the operationalizations of those key aspects in crisis 
management. Additional research could also be conducted to under-
stand the role of the news media as a third party in organization–public 
relationship development across the crisis life-cycle.
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